

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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P 021930Z NOV 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2169

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5846

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 2, 1973 (SALT TWO-336)

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT PRESENTED  
BY MINISTER SEMENOV, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1973

SEMNOV STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 2, 1973

AT THE OCTOBER 19, 1973 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION SET  
FORTH THE APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO THE  
QUESTION OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
ARMS. AT THAT TIME WE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF POSSIBLE  
MEASURES IN THIS AREA IN THE LIGHT OF THE TASK SPECIFIED IN  
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND DECLARED THAT THE  
SOVIET SIDE WAS READY IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT TO CONDUCT THE  
DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON THE  
QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ALONG  
WITH QUANTATIVE LIMITATIONS.

BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE THREAT  
OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR COULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN

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LIMITING THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A WHOLE. AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING THE LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF LIMITATIONS UNDER A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. A BN ON NEW TYPES OS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE THREAT OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR WOULD MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO FULFILLING THOSE TASKS OF STRENGTHENING UNIVERSAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND HALTING THE ARMS RACE, WHICH THE USSR DELEGATION ADDRESSED IN ITS STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 30, 1973.

A BUILD-UP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, PARTICULARLY BY DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES AND BY ACCELERATED IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROGRAMS, WOULD NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO FULFILLMENT OF THESE TASKS OR TO THE STRENGTHENING OF MUTUAL TRUST. NATURALLY, ACTIONS OF THIS KIND CANNOT BE IGNORED.

AS YOU KNOW, THE QUESTION OF BANNING CERTAIN TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WAS DISCUSSED IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS PHASES IN GENEVA. THE U.S. SIDE STATED ITS READINESS TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTIN. ON SOME ASPECTS COINCIDENCE OR PROXIMITY OF POINTS OF VIEW BECAME APPARENT.

THE RECORD OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WAS EXAMINED AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE SOVIET SIDE DURING THE WORKING RECESS, IN PREPARING THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TABLED OCTOBER 9, 1973. ARTICLE X OF THIS DOCUMENT PROVIDES THAT THE SIDES WOULD ASSUME THE OBLIGATION AS OF A AAGREED DATE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY CERTAIN SPECIFIC TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THAT ARTICLE INCLUDES, IN PARTICULAR, A PROVISION CONCERNING THE OBLIGATIONOF THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY SUBMARINES OF A NEW GENERATION ARMED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS MEASURE IS CLEAR, CONSIDERING THE ROLE PLAYED BY SLBM SUBMARINES IN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

INDEED, DOES IT MEET THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
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ARMS, WHEN ONE OF THE SIDES HAS BEGUN DEVELOPMENT OF SUBMARINES OF A NEW GENERATION ARMED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUCH AS THE U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINE WHICH IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT? CLEARLY, IT DOES NOT. MOREOVER, SUCH ACTIONS COULD HAVE A CLEARLY DESTABILIZING EFFECT AND COULD INCREASE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. CON ERSELY, ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY NEW GENERATION SLBM SUBMARINES WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION

TO LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR; THIS WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF BOTH THE USSR AND THE U.S., AS WELL AS OF ALL THE STATES OF THE WORLD.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION YOU RAISED, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT NEW GENERATION SLBM SUBMARINES INCLUDE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE X OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, THOSE TYPES OF NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE. SUCH BOATS ALSO INCLUDE THE ABOVE-MENTIONED U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINE. THUS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PROVISION OF ARTICLE X, THE U.S. SIDE WOULD HALT WORK ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW GENERATION NUCLEAR-POWERED SLBM SUBMARINES, SPECIFICALLY THE TRIDENT TYPE SUBMARINE. IN THAT CASE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO NOT DEVELOP SUCH TYPES OF SUBMARINES.

THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO PROPOSES THAT THE SIDES ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS WHICH WILL BE AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC AVIATION. BY WAY OF AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION ASKED BY THE U.S. SIDE WE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY THAT, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE X OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. B-1 BOMBER WHICH IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT, AS WELL AS OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE. NATURALLY, THIS OBLIGATION WOULD BE MUTUAL AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO NOT DEVELOP SUCH TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

ARTICLE X ALSO PROVIDES THAT THE SIDES WOULD ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. THIS OBLIGATION WOULD ALSO BE MUTUAL  
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AND WOULD APPLY TO BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5846

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IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS THE SOVIET SIDE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS PROPOSAL IN DETAIL AND COMPREHENSIVELY. WE ASSUME THAT THE ARGUMENTS EXPRESSED EARLIER ARE BEING KEPT IN MIND BY THE U.S. SIDE. BY WAY OF AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION RAISED BY THE U.S. SIDE, WE WOULD MERELY LIKE TO ADD THAT, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE X OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, IT IS PROPOSED THAT LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES BE DEFINED AS SUCH MISSILES HAVING A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM.

THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO PROPOSES THAT EACH OF THE SIDES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES. BANNING THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BLOCK A CHANNEL BY MEANS OF WHICH THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT COULD TURN OUT TO HAVE BEEN CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THIS KIND OF INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILE, WHICH IN TERMS OF ITS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES COULD BE FULLY COMMENSURATE WITH LAND-BASED ICBMS.

ARTICLE X OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR AN OBLIGATION THAT THE SIDES NOT DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES. IN TERMS OF THEIR TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS SUCH MISSILES COULD BE COMPARED TO SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES. BANNING THEM WOULD BLOCK STILL  
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ANOTHER CHANNEL FOR THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE WORDING OF THIS OBLIGATION HAS BEEN WORKED OUT WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL ADVANCED EARLIER ON BANNING SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES SPECIALLY DESIGNED TO STRIKE LAND TARGETS. WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT, FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE X, STRATEGIC SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES MUST

INCLUDE SUCH CRUISE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS.

ARTICLE X OF THE SOVIET DRAFT CONTAINS A PROVISION FOR AN OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE PLATFORMS AND ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES (OTHER THAN SUBMARINES). TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNLIMITED DURATION OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, PROHIBITING THESE POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR A BUILD-UP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE TASKS SET BY THE PARTIES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO PROPOSES THAT EACH OF THE SIDES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY FIXED OR MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUB-SOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INTERNAL WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT WITH THE BOTTOM. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS A COINCIDENCE OF THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE SIDES BECAME APPARENT WITH RESPECT TO THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH A BAN, AS WAS ALSO THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO A BAN ON INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES AND STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES (OTHER THAN SUBMARINES).

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE, SET FORTH IN ARTICLE X OF THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT, WERE WORKED OUT IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

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IN PROPOSING THESE MEASURES, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF RECENT YEARS, WHICH SHOWS THAT IF ONE OF THE SIDES BUILDS UP A MILITARY POTENTIAL, THE OTHER SIDE REACTS ACCORDINGLY TO SUCH ACTIONS, AS WAS THE CASE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF A LARGE NUMBER OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM SUBMARINES, AND OTHERS. IT COMES TO MIND THAT IN THE COURSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THE U.S. SIDE ALSO REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT THE NECESSITY OF PUTTING AN END TO THE VISCIOUS "ACTION-REACTION" CYCLE.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A REPETITION OF SUCH A CYCLE IN THE FUTURE WOULD NOT BE IN LINE WITH THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WOULD BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE POSITIVE TRENDS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., WHICH BEGAN

TO TAKE SHAPE AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT  
MEETINGS IN MAY 1972 AND JUNE 1973. FOR DETENTE AND PEACE  
TO BE DURABLE, IT IS NECESSARY TO APPLY JOINT EFFORTS TO  
PREVENTING A RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND TO  
LIMITING THEM.

AGREEING ON AND IMPLEMENTING THE OBLIGATIONS  
PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE X OF THE DRAFT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY  
BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS  
PLACED FOR US AND TO STRENGTHENING UNIVERSAL PEACE AND  
SECURITY.  
JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
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